In most states, criminals lose their voting rights while incarcerated (the sole exceptions being Maine and Vermont). However, a majority of those states have some provision for criminals to regain those rights upon release or upon completion of parole or probation (although for some of those states there are some barriers to regain rights). Yet, several states such as Florida, Alabama, and Virginia allow some criminals to regain their rights only by the action of the governor and the courts. These policies are often highly contentious. Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe, for instance, announced an executive order to restore voting right to felons upon completion of parole or probation in 2016 -- but that order was overturned by the Virginia Supreme Court. Consider the various theories of punishment we have studied. Is there any justification for punishing a criminal by taking away one's voting rights? Especially considering that the criminal is already being punished by incarceration? Or is there some other reason to take away these rights?
According to Jeremy Bentham's "Principle of Utility", punishing a criminal by taking away their voting rights is not justified. In the "Principle of Utility", Bentham emphasizes his belief that punishments should be advantageous to the individuals of a society and should be used solely as a means of preventing any harm to the society. His principle is laid out as follows: He first discusses "Cases Unmeet for Punishment" - Here he states that (I.) a government's primary purpose is to make the individuals of society happy, and one way of doing this is by preventing acts which cause misery and sadness - this is achieved through the use of punishments. (II.) Yet, he proceeds to claim that "all punishment is mischief"; these punishments should only be carried out as long as they prevent the occurrence of a "greater evil". (III.) Finally, he lists four sets of cases in which punishment is not applicable - (1.) when the act committed isn't harmful, (2.) when the punishment doesn't stop any harm or evil, (3.) when the punishment does more harm than the crime it is preventing, and (4.) when the mischief can be stopped at a lesser and "cheaper" punishment. Now, if the legal system was to use these points to judge whether the no-voting punishment is valid, here is what they would find: This punishment primarily interferes with point 2, in that taking away a criminal's voting rights doesn't necessarily benefit society or stop any real evil. Assuming that these criminals have already been or are currently being punished in some other way (such as a fine or imprisonment), this is the action that prevents harm to society - not the revoking of a criminal's voting privileges. In conclusion, as long as a criminal's voting rights have no direct relation to the crime or crimes that the person has committed (for example, assuming that the criminal hasn't committed an act such as voter fraud), taking away these rights would simply be an abuse of a government's punishing powers (at least, according to Jeremy Bentham).
ReplyDeleteConsidering the main two philosophies of punishment that we have studied – retributivism and utilitarianism – I believe that there are both arguments for and against these voting restrictions on criminals.
ReplyDeleteUtilitarianism, the so-called forward-looking punishment principle, is founded on the goal of preventing the crime from happening again and maximizing the happiness and overall wellbeing of the entire community. In this way, utilitarianism usually calls for punishments that outweigh the possible benefits of committing the crime again in order to act as a deterrent. As written by Jeremy Bentham in “Punishment and Utility,” “The value of the punishment must not be less in any case than what is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the offense” (29). Using this logic, one could argue that restricting criminals’ ability to vote - a right very important to many citizens – is necessary in deterring them and other community members from committing the crime again. Additionally, utilitarians could argue that removing voting rights from these “morally misguided” individuals is less destructive than what were to happen to the overall happiness, security, and pleasure of the community were they allowed to vote and determine fundamental aspects of the county. As Bentham concludes, “An action then may be said to be comformable to the principle of utility…when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish it” (22).
But, the retribution theory of punishment thoroughly questions these justifications. Richard Burgh, in his article, “Do the Guilty Deserve Punishment,” states that utilitarian beliefs are more of an attempt to lessen our moral guilt of punishment and directly violates justice in the process. In a powerful phrase, Burgh states that unjust actions are not just simply because they preserve the rights of a much bigger population (194). Therefore, unnecessarily punishing individuals in an attempt to prevent the crime from happening again the community is completely wrong. Conversely, retributivism focuses on the essential balance/equality between the crime committed and punishment distributed that is needed in order to obtain complete justice, the most important value to all communities. Therefore, criminals who have served their time in prison (or completed another court-mandated punishment) have completely rebalanced the scales and accounted for the unfair advantage that they achieved by committing the crime.
Overall, I tend to fall somewhere in the middle of these arguments. I agree that restricting someone’s rights simply to limit their voice and prevent their opinions from infiltrating the majority is completely unjust. The strength of a community is found in its diversity! But, I believe that extremely egregious crimes should have lasting consequences such as voting-right restriction in an attempt to deter and frighten other committing similar offenses.